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Note

Section 1983: An Analysis
of Damage Awards
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
I

INTRODUCTION

Very early in our judicial history Chief Justice Marshall stated:
"The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly
cease to deserve this high appelation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."'
Section 19832 was passed with the purpose of providing a means
of protecting a federal right, i.e., the right to enjoy fourteenth
amendment privileges and immunities. As Justice Douglas noted
3
in Monroe v. Pape:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to
afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws may not be enforced
and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the
state agencies. 4

The primary purpose of section 1983 was to give all persons, particularly the recently emancipated slaves, an effective weapon with
which to protect their rights and freedoms.5 However, the evolu-

1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (corresponds to Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat.
13). Now known as the Civil Rights Act, it provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Serv.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
4. 365 U.S. at 180.
5. Id. at 172-87. See also Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 68390 (1978); Comment, PunitiveDamages UnderFederalStatutes: A Functional
Analysis, 60 CALiF. L Rzv. 191, 201-02 (1972).
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tion and application of section 1983 throughout the years has been
neither clear nor consistent. Through judicial refinement it has
gradually been stripped of much of its force. 6 Its effectiveness as a
legal remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights was fur7
ther limited by the Supreme Court's decision in Carey v. Piphus.
In Carey, the Court held that school students who had been
suspended without procedural due process were entitled to recover only nominal damages from school officials, absent proof of
actual injury. 8 But more importantly, the Court decided that in order to further the purpose of section 1983 the common law rules of
damages should be used to formulate an appropriate remedy of
compensation. 9 After analyzing the judicial and legislative history
of section 1983, the Court concluded that the principle of compensation should adequately deter the violations of constitutional
rights, that only nominal damages should be awarded absent proof
of injury, and that punitive damages should be awarded only on a
finding of malicious intent.'0 These findings have a sweeping impact on all section 1983 litigation, particularly actions seeking redress for the indignity and the mental and emotional distress
caused by the deprivation of procedural due process.
H. FACTS
Two cases were consolidated for trial in Carey. One case was
brought by Piphus, a freshman high school student, whom the
principal observed passing an irregularly shaped cigarette back
and forth with other students while on school premises. The principal approached the students and smelled what he believed to be
the odor of burning marijuana. When the students became aware
6. 'The great fervor with which the elected representatives of the people decided to nationalize civil rights has been cooled by the breath of judicial construction." Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,50
Mic. L. REv. 1323, 1357 (1952).
7. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).

8. The district court found that the defense of good faith immunity was not
available to the school authorities because they failed to satisfy the twopronged test of Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). Analyzing this
finding, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that "although

there was no evidence that the defendants acted maliciously, and therefore
the first test of Wood v. Strickland... was satisfied, the defendants 'should
have known that a lengthy suspension without any adjudicative hearing of
any type would violate the constitutional rights of plaintiffs.'" 545 F.2d 30, 31
n.2 (7th Cir. 1976). Therefore, the second test enunciated in that decision was

not met. Inasmuch as the school authorities did not question this finding on
appeal, the Seventh Circuit decided that the district court's determination
was conclusive. Id. at 31.
9. 435 U.S. at 256-57.
10. Id. at 266.
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of the principal's presence, they threw the cigarette into a nearby
hedge." The principal took the students to the school's disciplinary office and directed the assistant principal to impose the usual
twenty-day suspension for using drugs. The students, including
Piphus, denied smoking marijuana, but to no avail. Meetings
among Piphus, his mother, his sister, school officials, and legal aid
representatives took place, but only to explain the reason for the
suspension, not to determine whether Piphus had been smoking
marijuana. 12 Piphus filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 134313 claiming he had been suspended without due process. Afhe was readmitted under a tempoter eight days of his suspension,
14
rary restraining order.
In the case which was consolidated with Piphus' at trial, the
student came to school wearing a small earring. The previous year
the principal had issued a rule forbidding males to wear earrings
because earrings were thought to denote membership in certain
street gangs and increase the likelihood that gang members would
terrorize other students. The student denied he was a member of a
gang and refused to remove the earring, asserting that it was a
symbol of his black pride.' 5 After unsuccessful efforts to persuade
the student to conform to the rule, school officials imposed a
twenty-day suspension. 16 The student fied suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 alleging he had been suspended without
due process in violation of the fourteenth amendprocedural
17
ment.
The district court's held that both students had been suspended without procedural due process' 9 but declined to award
damages without proof of injury. It decided that in the absence of
any demonstration by the plaintiffs regarding the nature and extent of their injuries, a recovery would be too speculative. 2 0
11. Id. at 248-49.
12. Id. at 249.
13. Section 1343 is the jurisdictional counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). It
gives federal district courts original jurisdiction to hear actions for damages
or equitable relief, or to redress the deprivation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution.
14. 435 U.S. at 250.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Piphus v. Carey, No. 76-1649 (D. ]1l. Nov. 5, 1975), rev'd, 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir.
1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
19. The school officials did not challenge the holding that the students were denied due process. The sole issue before the Supreme Court involved the right
to recover damages when procedural due process is denied.
20. 435 U.S. at 251-52.
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 21 reversed and remanded stating that even if the district court found that the students' suspensions
were justified, they were entitled to recover
"non-punitive" 22 damages simply because they had been denied
procedural due process. Such an award was justified on the notion
that a certain amount of injury is inherent in the nature of the
wrong just as it is inherent in the deprivation of other constitutional rights such as voting. According to the court, these damages
should be awarded even if there is no proof of injury to the individual such as mental distress. 2 3 Additionally, it stated that the
amount to be awarded when there is no proof of individualized injury is dependent on the nature of the wrong, yet it "should be
neither so24small as to trivalize the right nor so large as to provide a
windfall."
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, stating that
neither the difficulty of proving the injury nor the likelihood of its
occurrence was so great as to permit the award of compensatory
damages without proof of actual injury.25 The Court held the denial of procedural due process without2 6proof of actual injury to be
actionable for nominal damages only.
I1I.
A.

BACKGROUND OF SECTION 198327

Legislative Intent

The events which gave rise to section 1983 were the extensive
violations of human rights occurring in the South during the Re21. 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
22. 545 F.2d at 31.
23. The students argued before the Supreme Court that injury should be presumed to occur with every denial of due process. They compared this injury
to the intangible harm suffered in a case of defamation per se. Id. at 254. See
generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES 509 (1973); W. PRosSER, TORTS § 111 (4th ed, (1971); Yudof, Liabilityfor ConstitutionalTorts and
The Risk-Averse Public School Offiia4 49 S. CAL L. REv. 1322,1366 (1976).
24. 545 F.2d at 32.

25. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
26. Id. at 266.
27. The literature on section 1983 is enormous. See generally Bristow, § 1983: An
Analysis and Suggested Approach, 29 AaK. L. REV. 255 (1975); Chevigny,
Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352 (1970); Hill,
Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUm. L. REv. 1109, 1155-58 (1969); Nahmod,
Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974);
Yudof, supranote 23; Comment, CivilActionsforDamages Underthe Federal
Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEX. L. REv. 1015 (1967); Developments in the Law,
Section 1983 and Federalism,90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977); Note, Limiting the
Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1486
(1969); Note, Damages Under § 1983: The School Context, 46 IND. L. REV. 521
(1971).
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construction era. Through deliberate inactivity and disregard of
the law, state officials fostered outrageous violations of personal
rights, e.g., whippings, robberies, and murders. 2 8 Against this
background, section 1983 was passed, not only to alleviate the
atrocities perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan,29 but also the intentional maladministration of the laws by state officials. 30 Since the
offenses which culminated in the passage of section 1983 were of
an extreme and callous nature, the existence of mental distress, in
addition to physical injury, could readily be presumed. A much
more difficult problem, however, and one with which the courts
have consistently struggled, is determining the degree of mental
and emotional distress which occurs as a result of a nonviolent
abuse of an individual's constitutional rights, such as a denial of
procedural due process. Because mental and emotional distress is
a speculative injury and easily feigned, the courts have been reluctant to redress this variety of injury, fearing that 3trivial
cases will
1
tremendously increase the burden on the courts.
It seems unlikely, however, that Congress intended section 1983
to apply to outrageous conduct alone. As one commentator has
noted, "Severe deprivations can result from civilized conduct;
without brutality or outrageousness, a system can function effec'32
tively for all but a class against which it displays prejudice.
Since section 1983 was intended to be the guardian against abuses
perpetrated through official action and inaction, it has been urged
that Congress intended to give a broad remedy for the violations of
federally protected rights.33 In Imbler v. Pachtman, for instance,
Justice White noted in his concurring opinion: "It should hardly
need stating that, ordinarily, liability in damages for unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct has the very desirable effect of
deterring such conduct. Indeed this was precisely the proposition
28. See generally Developments in the Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
29. Id. at 1154.
30. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 153 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Garfield). See Developments in the Law, supra note 28 at 1137-56, (excellent discussion of the outrages that precipitated enactment of section 1983).
31. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAw OF TORTS § 18.4, at 1031 (1956).
32. Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1507-08 (1969).
33. "As the language itself makes clear, the central purpose of § 1983 is to 'give a
remedy to the parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position."' Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 433 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citing Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)). See Monell v. Department of Social Serv.,
436 U.S. 658, 685-86 n.45 (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 231
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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upon which § 1983 was enacted."3 4
Since no provision for damages was included in section 1983, it
has been difficult to determine the appropriate measure of recovery. In Carey, the Court interpreted the legislative history of section 1983 to mean that Congress intended no more formidable
deterrent than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages. 35 If, as the Court reasons, the purpose of section 1983 was
merely to compensate those individuals whose constitutional
rights had been violated under color of state law, then the common
law tort rules for damages will provide an appropriate solution.
But the Court's conclusion as to the purpose of section 1983 is certainly not unanimously accepted, as evidenced both by the minority opinions of the Court throughout the years3 6 and by several
legal commentators.3 7
B.

Monroe . Pape: The New Direction

The broad language and tremendous scope of section 1983 has
undoubtedly led to much of the confusion and distortion in its application. After a period of limited application, the Supreme Court,
in Monroe v. Pape,38 breathed new life into section 1983. The plaintiff in Monroe alleged that thirteen police officers entered his home
without warning and forced him and the other occupants to stand
naked in the living room while the entire house was ransacked.
Monroe was arrested, detained for ten hours at the police station,
and later released without being charged. He thereafter filed suit
against the officers under section 1983. Analyzing the legislative
history of section 1983, Justice Douglas concluded the statute had
4
three purposes:3 9 (1) to "override certain kinds of state laws"; 0
34. 424 U.S. at 442 (White, J., concurring). See Nahmod, Section 1983 and the
"Background"of Tort Liability,50 IND. L.J. 5, 32 (1974).
35. 435 U.S. at 256-57.
36. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring).

37. See text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
38. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part,Monell v. Department of Social Serv.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell the Court reexamined the scope of section 1983,
focusing in particular on the issue of whether municipal corporations were to
be included within the ambit of those who could be sued. After analyzing the
legislative history, the Court concluded that local governments were intended to be included among the persons to which section 1983 applies, and
accordingly overruled Monroe insofar as it held that local governments were

immune from suit under section 1983. 436 U.S. at 700-01. While immunity was
not a relevant issue in Carey,see note 8 supra,Monell is pertinent insofar as
it briefly examines the legislative debates on section 1983, and concludes as
did Justice Douglas in Monroe that it was a broad remedial act which was to
be "liberally and beneficially construed." 436 U.S. at 684.
39. Justice Douglas indirectly stated a fourth purpose of section 1983 in McNeese
v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), in which he included the additional
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(2) to provide "a remedy where state law was inadequate";4 1 and
(3) "to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
adequate in theory, was not available in practice." 42 It seemed that
section 1983 would become a truly formidable weapon to deter unconsitutional infringements of an individual's rights.
Nevertheless, Justice Douglas introduced a major complication
in Monroe which has had considerable impact on section 1983 litigation and has led to perplexing results. In a brief statement he
asserted that section 1983, should "be read against the background
of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. '43 This appears to have been the principle
upon which the Court in Carey concluded that the common law
tort rules should provide the model for compensatory damages in
section 1983 claims. 44 But this conclusion is questionable in light
of the explicit purposes of section 1983, which Justice Douglas articulated in Monroe v. Pape,45 and in light of the legislative intent.46 The Supreme Court's decision in Carey, although
consistent with earlier decisions by the Court, seems to be inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the law,47 and will, in many
instances, leave the individual who seeks recovery for mental and
emotional distress with a wholly inadequate remedy.
IV.

STATE TORT REMEDIES

The inherent problem encountered in applying state tort remepurpose, "to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any
remedy any State might have." Id. at 672. See also Note, supra note 32, at
1489-90.
40. 365 U.S. at 173.

41. Id.
42. Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 187.
44. This confusing position is also reflected in the lower courts. See, e.g., Basista
v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 1965).
45. See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
46. See text accompanying notes 28-35 supra.
47. As Justice Brennan explained in Adickes v. S.H.Kress & Co.:
Section 1983 in effect authorizes the federal courts to protect
rights "secured by the Constitution and laws" by invoking any of the
remedies known to the arsenal of the law. Standards governing the
granting of relief under § 1983 are to be developed by the federal
courts in accordance with the purposes of the statute and as a matter
of federal common law .... Of course, where justice requires it,
federal district courts are duty-bound to enrich the jurisprudence of
§ 1983 by looking to the remedies provided by the States wherein
they sit.. .. But resort to state law as such should be had only in
cases where for some reasonfederal remedial law is not and cannot
be made adequate to carry out the purposes of the statute.
398 U.S. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citations
omitted, emphasis added).
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dies to federal rights is that two entirely different interests are involved; state tort law protects a private right while section 1983
protects a public right.0 48 The primary emphasis of tort law is on
shifting the loss from the individual who is injured to the individual who perpetrates the injury.49 Its primary purpose is neither
punishment nor deterrence, but compensation.50 Justice Powell
was correct when he noted in Carey that the fundamental principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for
plaintiffs injury which was sustained through defendant's breach
of duty.5 ' At the same time the underlying policy of section 1983 is
quite different:
It seems clear, however, from the statements of a few legislators, the title
of the Act itself, and the circumstances surrounding its passage that the
Act's primary purpose was to enforce the fourteenth amendment by providing a positive, punitive, civil remedy for acts of racial discrimination.
Thus an award of damages would depend not on the common-law test of
whether a plaintiff had suffered a measurable physical or economic injury,
but on whether the defendant's conduct came within the scope of actions
that the statutes were intended to penalize. While traditional tort-law
damages rules may be appropriate to accomplish some of the civil rights
statutes' purposes, the tort-law rules do no [sic] allow full realization of
upon loss-shifting rather than
those purposes because of their emphasis
52
upon punishment and deterrence.

Common law tort remedies can often limit or prevent recovery

under circumstances designed to be remedied by section 1983,53 as

Justice Harlan noted in his concurring opinion in Monroe:
There will be many cases in which the relief provided by the state to the
victim of a use of state power which the state either did not or could not
constitutionally authorize will be far less than what Congress may have
thought would be fair reimbursement for deprivation of a constitutional
48. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. 2 F. HARPER &F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1301 (1956); W. PROSSER,
supra note 23, at 6.
50. W. PROSSER, supra note 23, at 9.
51. 435 U.S. at 254-55.
52. Comment, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights
Statutes, 45 TEx. L. REV. 1015, 1026 (1967) (emphasis added). See also text
accompanying notes 28-34 supra. The court of appeals in Carey held that if
the school administrators could prove on remand that the students would
have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been held, then the students would not be able to recover damages for the suspension, but only
damages resulting from the deprivation of due process rights. 545 F.2d at 32.
Indeed the whole idea of punitive damages has been forcefully criticized
as a windfall to the plaintiff who ought to receive compensation and no more.
But this may be true only in a theoretical sense, since the plaintiff will probably use the damage award to defray the expenses of litigation which are generally not reimbursed by the ordinary compensatory award. But more
importantly, punitive awards may be necessary to discourage official abuse of
authority. See D. DoBBs, supra note 23, at 220.
53. See Yudof, supra note 23, at 1370.
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right. I will venture only a few examples. There may be no damage remedy for the loss of voting rights or for the harm from psychological coercion leading to a confession. And what is the dollar value of the right to go
to unsegregated schools? Even the remedy for such an unauthorized
search and seizure as Monroe was allegedly subjected to may be only the
nominal amount of damages to physical property allowable in an action
for trespass to land.5 4

If one of the primary purposes of section 1983 was deterrence, 55
applying the common law principles of tort will often frustrate this
design because state tort remedies vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 6 For instance, an individual who prevails in a section 1983
suit in Nebraska may be denied punitive damages because Nebraska law does not permit such awards. 57 On the other hand, if
another party files a similar grievance in a state which permits recovery of punitive damages, the recovery would differ significantly
in many cases, although the injury, physical or mental, was indistinguishable.
As Justice Harlan warned in Monroe: "It would indeed be the
purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of commonlaw rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to redress
those injuries which only a state official can cause and against
which the Constitution provides protection." 58 Additionally, total
reliance on common law notions of tort is inconsistent with the legislative intent. When a federal statute provides redress for certain
conduct, the nature of the remedy, though often left to judicial discretion, is a federal question, the answer to which should be derived from the policy underlying enactment of the statute.59 As the
0
Supreme Court stated in Bell v. Hood:6
Moreover, where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been
the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that
where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any avail61
able remedy to make good the wrong done.

Furthermore, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,6 2 the Court
concluded that the "existence of a statutory right implies the exist54. 365 U.S. at 196 n.5 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring). See also
Nahmod, supra note 34, at 10-11, 32.
56. To apply state common-law rules of damages to issues under the Civil Rights
Act could, in certain circumstances, "create a legal hybrid of an incredible
and unworkable kind." Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 n.11, 87 (3d Cir. 1965).
See note 91 infra.
57. Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 230 N.W.2d 472 (1975).
58. 365 U.S. at 196 n.5 (Harlan, J., concurring).
59. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
60. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
61. Id. at 684.
62. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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ence of all necessary and appropriate remedies. '63
This is not to say that the common law principles of tort cannot
serve a valuable purpose when actions are filed under section 1983.
The rules of the common law may in certain instances provide an
appropriate base upon which to build. Tort rules are anything but
static and have demonstrated a high degree of adaptability to new
issues.6 4 In this regard, state tort remedies may be an instructive
and valuable model. Federal courts can look to the common law
principles of tort in order to supplement and enhance the federal
remedy if for some reason the federal remedy is inadequate to satisfy the legislative intent.65 Both remedies could be used in order
to best serve the purpose of deterring unconstitutional infringements; but it should not be forgotten that the principle of damages
for a federal right should be based on a federal rule that is responsive to the need when constitutional rights are violated.66 When
common law remedies are solely relied on as the Court in Carey
proposes, they may become unpredictable. 67 While the state tort
remedies can be a beneficial guide in certain instances, it is essential that the remedies for section 1983 violations do not derive entirely from state tort remedies, because the interests they protect,
while often similar, may not be entirely complementary. For instance, in Carey the nature of the students' injuries, in addition to
the pecuniary value of the days they were suspended, is injury to
their dignity, loss of esteem and/or damage to their reputation.
Since mental and emotional distress is not a readily detectable
loss, tort law may prevent recovery. Still, if the purpose of section
1983 is to deter violations of consitutional rights, an award of damages should depend not on whether the plaintiff suffered harm but
on whether the defendant acted in a manner intended to be deterred by the act.68 The words of Justice Brennan in Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Company69 are instructive:
63. Id. at 239.
64. W. PROSSER, supra note 23, at 3.
65. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 231 (1970) (Brennan, J., concur-

ring in part & dissenting in part).
66. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969).
67. See Nahraod, supra note 34:
To the extent that tort concepts of duty, proximate cause, and cause

in fact, as well as various defenses such as consent may assist a court
by analogy in deciding 1983 cases, well and good. But courts in 1983
cases should be careful not to let tort law alone determine 1983 liability; for not only possible different purposes, but different interests as
well are usually at stake.
Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added).
68. Comment, supra note 52, at 1023, 1025. Note that the Court disavowed a deterrence purpose for section 1983 in Carey. 435 U.S: at 256.
69. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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In other types of cases, however, the common law of torts may be divided
on important questions of defenses and relief, or it may be inadequate to
carry out the purposes of the statute. Thus the common law is not an infallible guide for the development of § 1983. In particular, denial of equal
protection on the basis of race was the central evil that § 1983 was
designed to stamp out. Where that is the basis for recovery, relief should
not depend on the vagariesof the generalcommon70law but should be governed by uniform and effective federal standards.

Congress enacts legislation to remedy the deficiencies of preexisting law including the common law.7 1 A primary purpose of
section 1983 was to interpose the federal government between the
states and the people as guardian and guarantor of federal rights.7 2
The states, applying their common law, were either unwilling or
incapable of remedying the widespread violations of human
rights.7 3 State officers were antagonistic towards vindicating federally created rights.7 4 Furthermore, there was an inherent potential for bias when state officials
were called upon to review the
75
actions of other state officials.
Since the purpose of section 1983 was to provide the necessary
means to protect constitutional rights,7 6 the path the Court has
elected to pursue in Carey-reliance on the tort remedies of the
common law to redress constitutional infringements-will prove to
be an inadequate remedy in many situations. There is no better
illustration of the problems encountered when common law remedies are the sole relief than in the area of recovery for emotional
and mental distress.
V.

MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

One court has described the state of the law regarding recovery
for mental or emotional distress in the following manner: "In respect to the right to recover damages for personal injuries result70. Id. at 232 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
71. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239, 242 (1972).
73.
If the State courts had proven themselves competent to suppress the
local disorders, or to maintain law and order, we shoild not have
been called upon to legislate upon this subject at all. But they have
not done so. We are driven by existing facts to provide for the several States in the South what they have been unable fully to provide
for themselves; i.e., the full and complete administration of justice in
the courts.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 653 (1871) (remarks of Senator Osborn).
74. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 242.
75. See Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction"
A Reply, 83 HARv. L REV. 1352, 1358
(1970).
76. See Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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ing from an emotional or mental disturbance, it has been said that
'the authorities are in a state of dissension probably unequalled in
the law of torts.' -77 This observation appears to adequately reflect
the state of turmoil and confusion which exists today among state

jurisdictions.

78

There are innumerable court positions on this

79
topic, none of which harmonize into any ,discernible pattern.
The courts have been reluctant to redress intangible injuries for
various reasons: 80 the notion that the injury is something metaphysical, too subtle and speculative to be capable of measurement
by any standard known to the law;8 1 the burden on society;82 and
the fear of false and trivial claims. 83 Moreover, there are typically
difficulties of proof in such cases. Mental suffering may be easily
feigned and extremely difficult to detect, so the individual's interest must be balanced against the burden on society of distinguish-

ing those who are actually injured from the impostors. Perhaps
the best explanation for refusing to properly compensate for these
injuries is the following- "Against a large part of the frictions and
irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation
in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a
better protection than the law could ever be. '84 Whatever the reason, the right of freedom from emotional distress has received
77. Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 316, 198 P.2d 696, 698 (1948).
78. J. STEm, DAMAGES AND REcovERY § 30, at 47-48 (1972).
79. For example, some jurisidctions follow the scientifically discredited rule that
physical contact must occur in order for emotional distress, and hence a damage award, to result. See H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AD PROPERTY
§ 177, at 252.5 to .6 (1961).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A, Comment b (1965), offers three explanations:
One is that emotional disturbance which is not so severe and serious
as to have physical consequences is normally in the realm of the trivial, and so falls within the maxim that the law does not concern itself
with trifles. It is likely to be so temporary, so evanescent, and so relatively harmless and unimportant, that the task of compensating for it
would unduly burden the courts and the defendants. The second is
that in the absence of the guarantee of genuineness provided by resulting bodily harm, such emotional disturbance may be too easily
feigned, depending, as it must, very largely upon the subjective testimony of the plaintiff; and that to allow recovery for it might open too
wide a door for false claimants who have suffered no real harm at all.
The third is that where the defendant has been merely negligent,
without any element of intent to do harm, his fault is not so great that
he should be required to make good a purely mental disturbance.
Id. at 461-62.
81. W. PROSSER, supra note 23, at 50.
82. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 49, § 18.4, at 1032.
83. Id. at 1032, 1034.
84. Magruder, Mental and EmotionalDisturbancein the Law of Torts, 49 HARv.
L REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).
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85
wholly incomplete protection by the law.
In Careythe Court found that courts of law are capable of making accurate estimations of actual injury in order to afford meaningful compensation. 86 To a limited extent a court may be able to
evaluate a student's pecuniary loss by looking at such factors as
the cost of securing private education for the period of the suspension, the additional cost of transportation to another school, and
the loss of earnings due to late graduation. Yet the problem of recovery for mental and emotional distress poses an entirely different question. This is an area of unparalleled confusion in the
law.87 To a large extent much of the confusion is due to the imprecise nature of the injury and the immense range of injuries included in the category,8 8 such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, chagrin and disappointment. 89 Where the
spectrum of compensable injuries among various jurisdictions includes everything from petty annoyances to permanent, disabling
injury, confusion is not only unavoidable but highly predictable. 90
It is difficult to find a completely satisfactory scale by which the
harm caused by emotional distress can be measured. How, for instance, can one place monetary value on a stigmatization? But, the
remedy for federally created rights should not vary with the geography-a highly probable occurrence if common law remedies are
applied or adapted to vindicate federal rights. 91 The measure of

85. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 49, § 18.4, at 1031.
86. 435 U.S. at 259. The Court in Carey cites the language of Justice Harlan in an
earlier case for the proposition that courts of law are capable of making the
types of judgments necessary to accord meaningful compensation for the invasion of constitutional rights. But Justice Harlan was speaking of fourth
amendment rights, and he even stated that "[t]he same... may not be true
with respect to other types of constitutionally protected interests." Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 409 n.9 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-

ring).
87. Annot., 64 A.LR.2d 100 (1959) (discussion of the numerous court positions on
the right to recover for emotional disturbance).
88. 1 T. SEDGWiCK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 43a, at 52 (9th ed.
1912).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965).

90. J. STEm, supra note 78, § 32, at 50.
91. The fear of unequal protection of the laws from state to state appears to have
been a crucial consideration behind the passage of section 1983. See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Chevigny, upra note 75, at 1357. In
Basvita, the court statec
We believe that the benefits of the [Civil Rights] Acts were intended
to be uniform throughout the United States, that the protection to
the individual to be afforded by them was not intended by Congress
to differ from state to state, and that the amount of damages to be
recovered by the injured individual was not to vary because of the
law of the state in which the federal court suit was brought. Federal
common law must be applied to effect uniformity, otherwise the Civil
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damages under section 1983 should be a uniform federal remedy,
92
available whenever a federal right is impaired.
Justice Powell was correct in Carey when he suggested that
damages for mental and emotional distress should not be pre93
sumed to flow from every deprivation of procedural due process.
Indeed, there may be instances in which the individual in fact experiences no indignity or distress from the violation, either because he or she is unaware that it constitutes a violation of a
constitutional right or because it is so petty that it goes unnoticed,
as when a student is unjustifiably sent home one-half hour early
from school. If the purpose of section 1983 is compensation as the
Court concludes in Carey,94 the harm to the individual is only
nominal. However, if the purpose of section 1983 is deterrence, a
reasonable assumption in light of the statute's background, then
the Court's focus should be on determining what remedy will adequately deter further violations. Nominal damages would seem to
be no more than a token gesture, a recognition of the legal right,
but hardly sufficient to deter further transgressions. 95
The Court in Carey seems to believe that there will be no difficulty in producing evidence of mental and emotional distress
caused by the denial of procedural due process: "Distress is a personal injury familiar to the law, customarily proved by showing the
nature and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff.,,96 But the effects of mental and emotional distress may not be
manifest for a long period, even though they are substantial, because physically undetectable harm may result.97 The effect of
this intangible injury may be so subtle and indirect that it is impossible to trace its effects directly. And, if the federal remedy is
Rights Acts would fail to effect the purposes and ends which Con-

gress intended.
340 F.2d at 86.
92. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 409-11 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Martin v. Duffle, 463 F.2d 464, 467 (10th Cir. 1972).

93.
94.
95.

96.
97.

The advantages of a uniform remedy have been well documented by legal
scholars. See, e.g., Chevigny, supra note 75; Comment, supra note 52. See
also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,231-33 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
435 U.S. at 263.
435 U.S. at 254-57.
However, in addition to nominal damages, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) provides
that in a section 1983 action, the court in its discretion may allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs. This would appear to
-serve as an inducement for those individuals who are reluctant to ifie an action due to the tremendous costs involved. Conversely, it may serve as a deterrent to public officials who might otherwise expect only minimal
reprimand for their actions. See Hutto v. Finney, 98 S.Ct.2565 (1978).
435 U.S. at 263-64.
See T. SEDGWICK, aupra note 88.
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to be grounded in state common law tort rules, proof of emotional
distress, absent physical manifestation of injury, may be insufficient to state a cause of action. 98 The variations in remedies for
mental distress among the states point up the necessity of a uniform federal remedy, to be developed by the federal courts, if the
purpose of section 1983 is to be fulfilled. Otherwise, recovery for
violation of the right to procedural due process will differ, depending on the state in which the violation occurred.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps ultimately the damage issue will have to be resolved
not by the judiciary but by the legislature. Congressional action to
make remedies uniform would certainly appear to be the most satisfactory solution. For instance, the legislature could provide for a
system of liquidated damages to redress deprivations of rights
which do not result in physical injury. The amount of damages
would be based on the reasoning of the court of appeals in Carey,
i.e., it "should be neither so small as to trivialize the right nor so
large as to provide a windfall." 99 The individual would be required
to substantiate any additional damages beyond this predetermined amount. This would have the advantage of deterring repeated or negligent abuses of authority without unnecessarily
inhibiting the discretion an official must exercise in the performance of his or her duties, particularly in the context of school administration. Alternatively, the legislature might provide for an
ombudsman to deal with section 1983 legislation, thus providing
the necessary resources to vindicate individual rights and to more
adequately control abuses.
The decision in Carey may seriously limit remedies under section 1983 for individuals who suffer mental distress as a result of an
official's abuse of authority. Those individuals who have had their
constitutional rights infringed may find themselves with a perfectly legitimate right but a wholly inadequate remedy. If one of
the Court's missions is to fill in the gray areas of the law by directing the law along lines which will insure that federal rights are
realities not promises, then the decision in Carey has cheated us.
David J. Dempsey '80

98. See notes 77-91 & accompanying text supra.
99. 545 F.2d at 32. See note 24 & accompanying text =pra.

